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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Order that is the subject of this appeal is a final order 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. The Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. Did The District Court Err In Concluding, As A Matter Of 
Law, That Defendant First Security's Operating Procedures Manual 
And Its Promises Of Continued Employment Did Not Create An Enforce-
able Implied-In-Fact Contract? The review of this question 
presents for review only questions of law; the standard of review 
is correction-of-error, and the district court's conclusions are 
entitled to no deference. See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 
131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 
772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989). 
B. Did The District Court Err In Its Conclusion That 
Defendant First Security Effectively Disclaimed The Implied-In-Fact 
Contract Created By Its Operating Procedures Manual? This issue 
involves only principles of law; the district court's view of the 
law is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, and is 
entitled to no deference. See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 
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131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 
772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989). 
C. Did The District Court Err In Ordering, As A Matter Of 
Law, That Plaintiff Sanderson Could Not Recover For Emotional 
Distress As Foreseeable Consequential Damages Arising From 
Defendant First Security's Contractual Breach Of Its Employment 
Contract With Plaintiff? This issue involves only principles of 
law; the district court's view of the law is reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard, and is entitled to no reference. 
See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990); 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 
1989). 
D. Did The District Court Err In Implicitly Concluding That 
The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Does Not Exist 
In Utah Employment Contracts? This issue involves only principles 
of law; the district court's view of the law is reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard, and is entitled to no deference. 
See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990); 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 Jtah 
1989) . 
E. Did The District Court Err In Permitting afendant I :st 
Security To File Plaintiff Sanderson's Deposition So As To Bet me 
Part Of The Record Cn Appeal, Even Though The District Court 
2 
Reviewed Only Certain Deposition Pages Attached To Plaintiff 
Sanderson's Pleadings? This issue involves only principles of law; 
the district court's view of the law is reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard, and is entitled to no deference. 
See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990); 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 
1989). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant Russell W. Sanderson ("Sanderson") 
instituted his wrongful termination action against 
Defendant/Appellee First Security Leasing Company ("First 
Security") on September 28, 1989, when Sanderson filed his 
Complaint. In that Complaint, Sanderson sought contract damages, 
including consequential damages, resulting from his termination by 
First Security. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On February 20, 1990, First Security filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 49-50), and requested oral argument. (R. 95-
96). After being fully briefed by the parties (R. 51-90, 116-206, 
217-55), the district court conducted a hearing on First Security's 
motion on March 23, 1990. (R. 258). 
3 
After that hearing took place, First Security applied to che 
district court for an order allowing the filing of Sanderson's 
deposition, even though the district court did not have that 
deposition before it when considering First Security's motion. 
(R. 259-60). Sanderson opposed that motion (R. 263-67); 
nonetheless the district court granted the application without a 
hearing (R. 261, 279-80). 
Finally, on April 9, 1990, First Security served on 
Sanderson's counsel its proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 287); on April 12, 1990, Sanderson served 
his objection to that proposed Order. (R. 290). 
C. DISPOSITION AT DISTRICT COURT 
On March 28, 1990, the district court entered an order 
permitting the entire Sanderson deposition to be filed. (R. 261). 
After considering Sanderson's objections to that order, the 
district court issued a Minute Entry explaining why it was 
permitting Sanderson's deposition to be filed. A copy of that 
Minute Entry is included herein as Addendum "A". On April 11, 
1990, the district court entered Summary Judgment in favor of First 
Security, and also entered its Order Granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, (R. 282-83, 285-86). A copy of the district 
court's Order granting summary judgment is included herein as 
Addendum "B". 
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On May 10, 1990, Sanderson timely filed his Notice of Appeal. 
(R. 305-06). 
V. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
From the time of his hiring in 1980, until the time First 
Security terminated him,1 Sanderson was given increasingly 
responsible positions with First Security, and received sizeable 
salary increases.2 
Until May 1983, First Security employed Sanderson as a Leasing 
Officer II (R. 198). He was then promoted to Leasing Officer I and 
assistant vice president, a position he held until June 1984 when 
he was again promoted to an "unclassified-exempt" (from overtime) 
status. (R. 198). Finally, in August 1985 Sanderson was named 
vice president and manager of First Security's Equipment Services 
Department, and a member of First Security's Senior Management 
Committee. (R. 18, 198). 
1
 Throughout this action, Sanderson has claimed he was 
involuntarily terminated (R. 2, 171); First Security contends 
Sanderson quit (R. 20, 171). It is obvious that the question of 
whether Sanderson quit or was terminated is a question of fact, 
inappropriate for summary judgment. Accordingly, the district 
court did not and could not address this issue in its ruling. 
Rather, the district court merely ruled as a matter of law that 
First Security had not modified Sanderson's at-will employment 
status. 
2
 Sanderson received 8% raises in 1986, 1987, and 1988. 
(R. 131, 198). During the same time, his performance rating 
increased from 5.8 to 6.2 out of a possible 7. (R. 131, 198). 
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Until December 1988, Sanderson was responsible for both the 
Account Services and Equipment Services Departments. As 
Sanderson's responsibilities grew he did not have time to manage 
both departments. Accordingly, on December 6, 1988, First Security 
assigned the Account Services Department to another employee so 
that Sanderson could "devote 100% of his time in developing the 
Equipment Services Department," (R. 143-44, 150). 
In explaining this change, Sanderson's superior attested that 
Sanderson had "done an excellent job in managing both areas, but 
with this added responsibility and challenge, it is not fair to 
spread his talents so thin." (R. 143-44, 150). At the time of 
this change, Sanderson was given an 8% salary increase — to 
$46,069.92 per year — and was given a performance rating of 6.2 
out of a possible seven points (R. 131, 198). This was the highest 
rating Sanderson had earned in the past three years. (R. 131, 
198). 
During this period of Sanderson's employment, and since at 
least 1982, First Security had in effect an Operating Procedures 
Manual (the "Manual") consisting of 145 pages, which governed, 
among other things, the procedures to be followed when disciplining 
and discharging employees. OP 6-5.2 of the Manual — the procedure 
central to Sanderson's claims — provides: 
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POLICY 
1. First Security follows the Managing for 
Improvement Procedure as a guideline for 
disciplinary action taken by management for 
all First Security Employees (officer/non-
officer) . 
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY THE MANAGING FOR 
IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE, 
2. The Managing for Improvement Procedure is 
used to deal with two distinct types of 
disciplinary problems. 
(a) Job Performance; Repeated failure 
to meet performance standards. 
(b) Policy Violation: 
(1) Repeated violations of 
First Security work rules/policy. 
(2) A single, serious 
violation of work rules/policy. 
DOCUMENTING THE MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT 
PROCEDURE. 
3. Documentation is described in detail in 
Volume V of the Personnel Communication 
Series, Employment Practices. 
(a) Documentation at the informal stage 
is not retained in the Employee Personnel 
File. 
(b) Documentation at the formal state is 
retained in the Employee Personnel File. 
MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE. 
4. (a) Informal Stage — The informal stage 
is used to address initial job performance/ 
policy violation problems. 
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(1) Discuss the situation with the 
employee. Listen to the employee and 
work together to determine causes for 
apparent problems. 
(2) If a job performance problem 
exists, determine if the employee has had 
sufficient training. 
(3) If a policy violation has 
occurred, determine if the employee 
understands work rules/policy. 
(4) Discuss appropriate behavior 
with the employee. Make sure that the 
employee understands what is expected and 
the consequences for repeated violation. 
(b) Formal Stage — The formal stage is 
used to rectify job performance/policy 
violation problems which have not been 
resolved at the informal stage. Use of 
the formal stage is also appropriate if 
the employee falls into a pattern of 
repeated violation after showing a short 
term change in behavior as a result of 
involvement in the informal stage. 
(1) Job Performance Problems: 
(A) When informal action is 
ineffective, prepare a plan for 
improvement with the employee. 
Describe the behavioral change 
required, time frame allotted 
for improvement, and 
consequences resulting from 
failure to improve, which may 
include probation, suspension, 
or salary review. 
(B) If the employee does not 
improve performance within the 
allotted time frame, place the 
employee on probation for a 
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period of time not to exceed 
ninety (90) days. 
(C) If the employee does not 
improve performance during the 
probationary period, terminate 
the employee in accordance with 
bank/subsidiary policy. 
(2) Policy Violation Problems: 
(A) Prepare a written warning 
for the employee when informal 
discussion of a policy 
violation has been ineffective. 
Include a record of events, 
behavior that violated the work 
rule/policy, and the 
consequences resulting from 
repeated violation. 
(B) If violations continue 
after a written warning, 
suspend the employee for a 
period of one to three days 
without pay. 
(C) If violations occur after 
the suspension, terminate the 
employee. 
TERMINATION GUIDELINES 
5. Suspension/terminations resulting from 
this procedure are to be approved by the 
Division/Subsidiary Head Office. 
6. In situations where employee behavior 
warrants immediate termination the stages of 
this proces do not need to be followed. 
Termination in these cases must be approved by 




7. Employees involved in the formal stage of 
the procedure are not eligible for job 
announcements (where applicable), and salary 
increases. 
(R. 139-141).3 
The Manual accordingly sets forth mandatory procedures to be 
followed by First Security in terminating its employees. In 
particular, Policy No. OP 6-5.2 provides that First Security must 
adhere to a program of progressive discipline before terminating 
an employee for reasons other than for cause.4 Where terminating 
its employees, other than for cause, the Manual requires First 
Security to give the employee written warnings, to develop plans 
for improvement with the employee, and to put the employee on 
probation or suspension before termination. 
3
 The actual pages from the Manual containing OP 6-5.2 are 
included herein as Addendum "C". 
4
 First Security also claims, inconsistently with its claim 
that Sanderson quit, that it terminated Sanderson "for cause." 
(R. 58, 218, 223). Again, the issue of whether Sanderson was 
terminated for cause or other than for cause is a question of fact, 
not a question of law, and was not, and could not have been, 
addressed by the district court in its resolution of First 
Security's summary judgment motion. See, e.g. , Swanson v. Liquid 
Air Corp., 55 Wash. App. 917, 781 P.2d 900, 903 (App. 1989); Jones 
v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp. 779 P.2d 783, 789 (Alaska 1989); 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 
N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980). 
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During his tenure as a First Security supervisor and manager, 
Sanderson was given numerous copies of the Manual, told to follow 
the Manual, observed First Security following OP 6-5.2 in terminat-
ing employees, and did in fact use the Manual and the procedures 
contained in it when disciplining and terminating an employee. 
(R. 183-85, 189-90). At no time before First Security terminated 
Sanderson, however, did he receive any written plan for improve-
ment, nor was he ever put on probation or suspended as required by 
the Manual. (R. 20, 145-46). 
The Manual nowhere contains any disclaimer making clear the 
mandatory procedures required by the Manual are discretionary, not 
binding on First Security, or otherwise illusory, or that First 
Security claims the right to ignore the Manual as it sees fit. 
Two employee handbooks — entirely separate documents from the 
Manual — contain language purporting to preserve First Security's 
alleged right to terminate employees such as Sanderson without 
cause and for no reason, i.e. at First Security's will. (R. 81, 
84, 236). Those purported disclaimers are, however, in the same 
typeface as all the other provisions in those handbooks, are 
inconspicuously buried among other provisions rather than being 
prominently displayed, contain no highlighting, borders or other 
signals calling an employee's attention to those provisions, and 
make no reference whatever to the Manual. (R. 81, 84, 236). 
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First Security manifested its commitment to OP 6-5.2 — ~he 
employee termination procedure in the Manual — in numerous ways. 
The language used in the Manual is mandatory. First Security 
provided Sanderson with several copies of the Manual containing OP 
6-5.2. (R. 183). Sanderson was directed to follow OP 6-5.2, and 
did in fact follow it in terminating a subordinate employee. 
(R. 189-90, 196-97). Sanderson observed other First Security 
supervisors follow the procedures in OP 6-5.2 when terminating 
employees. (R. 184-85, 189, 196). First Security even gave 
Sanderson a copy of OP 6-5.2 at the time of his exit interview 
(R. 183). 
It was against this background that Sanderson approached C.S. 
"Bud" Cummings ("Cummings"), Sanderson's direct supervisor, when, 
during 1988 and 1989, Sanderson experienced physical and emotional 
difficulties which kept him away from work, and, in some cases 
required his hospitalization. Sanderson was hospitalized 
approximately five or six times during this period. (R. 162-63, 
167) . Sanderson's doctors encountered difficulty in diagnosing the 
source of Sanderson's illness. (R. 162-63, 167). 
During the period of these difficulties and hospitalizations, 
Sanderson and Cummings had several conversations about Sanderson's 
health and the effect it is having on Sanderson'b job attendance. 
Cumminas repeatedly told Sanderson not to worry and to take all the 
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time he needed to regain his health. He assured Sanderson that his 
existing job would be retained for him during his illness and 
recovery. (R. 181-82, 186). 
On approximately April 3, 1989, Gary Judd ("Judd") was given 
the responsibility of managing the Equipment Services Department 
during Sanderson's illness. (R. 242). Based on past events, 
Sanderson believed that Judd was "out to get" Sanderson (R. 171). 
Shortly after Judd assumed this responsibility, he began 
criticizing Sanderson's performance in written memos. (R. 242-48, 
249-55). Significantly, however, none of those memos was directed 
to Cummings, Sanderson's supervisor. (R. 242, 249). 
Three days before First Security terminated Sanderson, Judd 
called Rob Garff ("Garff"), a social worker treating Sanderson 
under the supervision of Sanderson's psychiatrist. Garff told Judd 
that Sanderson was under stress and emotional upset, and would need 
at least two weeks leave of absence from work. (R. 204-06). Judd 
professed concern to Garff that whatever First Security did "might 
cause an adverse reaction" in Sanderson. (R. 206). Garff replied 
that Sanderson needed "a little time . . . to get himself under 
control." (R. 206). Garff recommended, in conclusion, that 
Sanderson be given a short leave of absence, perhaps two weeks 
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(R. 206).5 Instead of accept aq that recommendation, and with full 
knowledge of the consequences of terminating Sanderson, First 
Security terminated Sanderson when he declined to accept a demotion 
to an undefined job. (R. 131-32, 134). 
On May 15, 1989 Cummings and Judd advised Sanderson that First 
Security would terminate Sanderson's employment without notice or 
warning unless Sanderson accepted a demotion to another unspecified 
position, at a greatly reduced salary. (R. 168, 172-73). First 
Security never told Sanderson what job he would be demoted to. 
(R. 168-73, 194-95). When Sanderson declined to accept this 
unspecified job, First Security terminated him. (R. 131-32, 134). 
First Security's own records identify Sanderson's termination as 
involuntary (R. 131-32, 134). Moreover, First Security paid 
Sanderson severance pay, a benefit specifically denied by the 
Manual to employees who quit or who are terminated for "cause" 
(R. 191-94, 200). First Security's own documents therefore 
establish that Sanderson was terminated for reasons other than for 
"cause," and that First Security was obliged to follow OP 6-5.2. 
Nevertheless, First Security ignored all the procedures published 
in the Manual at OP 6-5.2. 
Judd's memorandum of that conversation, along with a 
verbatim transcription, is included herein as Addendum "D". 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based on the undisputed record in this case, this Court should 
reverse the district court's summary judgment and remand this case, 
directing the district court to enter judgment finding First 
Security liable to Sanderson, and directing the district court to 
conduct a trial solely on the issue of Sanderson's damages. 
At the least, however, the reasonability of Sanderson's 
reliance requires the district court's summary judgment to be 
reversed, and a trial held on Sanderson's claims that First 
Security's Manual and Cummings' oral assurances created a binding 
implied-in-fact contract between First Security and Sanderson. 
At that trial, Sanderson is entitled to present evidence 
concerning the emotional distress he suffered as a result of First 
Security's contract breach, and that this emotional distress was 
foreseeable to First Security. In addition, Sanderson is entitled 
to present evidence concerning First Security's breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
In considering this appeal, this Court should make no 
reference to Sanderson's November 7, 1989 deposition (R. 311) in 
its deliberations for the reason that the district court did not 
have that deposition before it at the time it granted First 
Security's motion for summary judgment. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from the district court's grant of summary 
judgment. In appellate review of summary judgments, the implicit 
standard of review is whether the district court erred "as a matter 
of law." See, Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 142 
U.A.R. 7, 15 n. 5 (1990). Because summary judgment is granted as 
a matter of lawf the appellate court is free to reappraise the 
district court's legal conclusions. See, e.g., Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis Nat'l. Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). In conducting 
its reviewf the appellate court affords the district court's legal 
conclusions no deference; they are reviewed de novo. See, e.g., 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomcruist, 773 P.2d 
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). In reviewing a district court's grant of 
summary judgment, this Court views the facts and inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. 
See e^q., Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 139 U.A.R. 3, 4 (1990). 
In its pleadings before the district court, First Security 
asserted the contradictory, but equally self-serving, positions 
that Sanderson (1) quit, and (2) was involuntarily terminated for 
cause. (R. 20, 58, 171, 218, 233). First Security's own documents 
belie both these assertions. Rather, the relevant documents fully 
support Sanderson's claim that he was involuntarily terminated for 
alleged "unsatisfactory performance" without first being afforded 
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the protections the Manual and Cummings, his supervisor, promised 
him. 
To the extent the exact nature of Sanderson's severance from 
First Security is at issue, First Security's summary judgment 
motion should never have been granted. District courts are 
prohibited from resolving disputed issues of material fact in the 
context of summary judgments. See, e.g.. Hardy v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Amer., 763 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah 1988). To the extent there 
is any dispute surrounding the nature of Sanderson's termination, 
therefore it must be resolved in the light most favorable to 
Sanderson. See e.g., Projects Unlimited, 142 U.A.R. at p. 8. 
First Security's own records establish, however, that 
Sanderson was terminated for alleged "unsatisfactory performance." 
(R. 131-134). Sanderson's claim pursuant to First Security's 
Operating Procedures is simply that First Security fired him 
without observing its own mandatory discipline and termination 
procedures, and that he is entitled to damages resulting from First 
Security's breach of their implied-in-fact contract. 
By publishing and following these procedures, First Security 
knew or should have known all its employees would rely on the 
Manual's assurances. Thus, an implied-in-fact contract was created 
rebutting the employment-at-will presumption. First Security's 
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failure to observe its own procedures accordingly provides 
Sanderson with an action for wrongful discharge. 
A. The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Manual 
And Cummings' Promises of Continued Employment Did Not Create An 
Enforceable Implied-in-fact Contract. The landmark Utah case 
establishing that employee handbooks give rise to binding implied-
in-fact employment contracts was Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). In Berube, defendant employer had a 
policy of terminating employees without prior warning only for a 
few specific reasons, including the refusal to take a polygraph 
test. In all other situations, however, the employer indicated 
that termination would occur only when the employee was properly 
warned and given a reasonable opportunity to improve performance. 
As has First Security, the employer had issued a policy providing 
for extensive warning procedures in order to give the employee time 
to improve. See, id. at 1047. The employer ignored its own policy 
and terminated the employee for her refusal to take a third 
polygraph test. After a jury trial, the employer was found not 
liable to the employee, and she appealed. 
On appeal, this Court reversed the jury verdict and ordered 
a new trial in which the jury would determine whether an implied-
in-fact contract was created by the employer's policy. See, id. 
at 1044, 1052. In that case, this Court found that the employment-
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at-will doctrine is merely a presumption which may be rebutted by 
evidence demonstrating an implied-in-fact contract existed. 
The Berube plurality explained why employee manuals are 
implied-in-fact contracts: 
An employee may demonstrate that his at-will termination 
breached an express or implied agreement with the 
employer to terminate him for cause alone . • . Such 
evidence may be found in employment manuals, oral 
agreements, and all circumstances of the relationship 
which demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause 
or to continue employment for a specific period. . . . 
Id. at 1044 (citations omitted). 
Justice Zimmerman, concurring in the result, elaborated: 
Because the at will doctrine is only a presumption, the 
presumption can be rebutted by demonstrating that the 
parties did not intend the arrangement to be at will. 
In this context, the representations made by the employer 
and employee manuals, bulletins and the like are 
legitimate sources for determining the apparent 
intentions of the parties. 
Id. at 1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
This specific holding was foreshadowed by an earlier case, 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 
1981). There, plaintiff counselor sued defendant college for 
wrongful discharge because the college failed to follow its own 
published termination procedure, which was functionally identical 
to the termination procedure adopted by First Security in its 
Manual. 
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Prior to his discharge, the counselor had a series of one-year 
employment contracts with the college. Midway through the 
counselor's final year, the college advised him his contract would 
not be renewed. The counselor sued the college, arguing the non-
renewal violated his rights as set forth in the college's personnel 
manual. The college argued that because the counselor's contract 
expired by its own terms, the counselor was not dismissed at all, 
but simply not rehired. See, Id. 
In affirming the district court's verdict for the counselor, 
this Court established that an employer may "undertake a 
contractual obligation to observe particular termination 
formalities by adopting procedures or by promulgating rules and 
regulations governing the employment relationship." Ld. at 1066. 
The first Utah employee handbook and termination procedure 
case after Berube was Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 
777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989). In Caldwell, defendant's employer had 
a policy of not discharging employees for cause unless and until 
three steps had been followed. The employer also had a policy that 
no notice would be given to employees terminated for reasons other 
than cause. In finding that the employee was terminated for 
reasons other than cause, and therefore not entitled to expect the 
puDlished procedures, Justice Zimmerman synthesized the plurality 
and concurring Berube opinions: 
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[A]n employer's internally adopted policies and 
procedures concerning discharge can be sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of at-will employment 
and can, in effect, become part of the contractual 
relationship between the employer and the employee. 
Id. at 485. 
This Court again considered employee manuals and termination 
procedure issues in Arnold v. Titan Servs. Co., 783 P.2d 541 (Utah 
1989). There the employer's operating manual established 
procedures for disciplining and terminating employees that 
generally correspond to First Security's OP 6-5.2. See, Id. at 
542-43. The employer failed to follow those procedures in 
terminating the employee. Nevertheless, after a bench trial, the 
court dismissed the employee's complaint. 
In reversing the district court, this Court set forth a three-
part burden a plaintiff must meet in proving his discharge was 
wrongful under an implied-in-fact contract created by an employee 
manual: (1) that the termination is made without adherence to the 
procedures set out in an operating manual; (2) that the discharge 
violated the procedures set out in the operating manual; and (3) 
that there was no justification for not following the procedures. 
See, Id. at 544. Because the employee had satisfied those three 
elements, this Court reversed and remanded, not for a retrial, but 
solely for the determination of damages. See, id. 
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In this case, Sanderson has satisfied all the elements. 
Sanderson was involuntarily terminated. (R. 131-32, 134). 
Sanderson was never given a written plan for improvement, was never 
placed on probation, and was never suspended. See, (R. 20, 145-
46). Sanderson's consistent salary increases and exceptional 
performance ratings demonstrate First Security had no sufficient 
justification for ignoring its published Manual. First Security 
provides no justification for not following its own procedures. 
OP 6-5.2 applied to Sanderson's employment relationship with First 
Security, and First Security admittedly failed to follow it in 
terminating Sanderson for alleged "unsatisfactory performance." 
Accordingly, the district court's summary judgment should be 
reversed, and this matter should, as in Titan Services, be remanded 
solely for the determination of Sanderson's damages. 
At the least, however, First Security's claimed justification 
presents a material factual — not a legal — issue, requiring the 
district court's summary judgment to be reversed. Berube 
established that the question of whether an employment manual 
creates an implied-in-fact contract is inappropriate for summary 
judgment, but must instead be decided by the jury: 
[T]he determination of whether sufficient indicia of an 
implied-in-fact promise exists is a question of fact for 
the jury, with the burden of proof residing upon the 
plaintiff-employee. 
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Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044 (plurality opinion). See also. Id. at 
1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
OP 6-5.2 requires that employees terminated other than for 
cause must first receive formal progressive discipline. (R. 139-
41) . Sanderson was involuntarily terminated for reasons other than 
"cause." (R. 134). While First Security does not pay severance 
pay if an employee quits or is fired for cause, (R. 200), Sanderson 
received severance pay when First Security terminated him. 
(R. 191-94). First Security never prepared a written plan for 
improvement in consultation with Sanderson, never placed him on 
formal probation and never suspended him, each of which was a 
necessary step before terminating a First Security employee for 
reasons other than "cause." (R. 140). 
In light of the holdings of the above decisions, and the 
undisputed and disputed material facts in this case, the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment. The district court 
further erred in treating Sanderson's claims as if they presented 
only legal issues. There is a fundamental and material factual 
question that the district court could not resolve in connection 
with a summary judgment motion adverse to Sanderson: was First 
Security justified in ignoring its own procedures? 
It was similarly erroneous for the district court to rule 
there was no factual question concerning the oral representations 
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made by Cummings. As pointed out in the Berube plurality, the test 
is whether an employer's actions were inconsistent with an ex-
employee's objectively reasonable expectation. See, Berube 771 
P.2d at 1048. 
Sanderson contends Cummings assured Sanderson that his 
existing job would still be available to him whenever he overcame 
his health problems. (R. 181-82, 186). First Security disagrees. 
Berube establishes that the question of whether such employer 
promises create a contract is a question for the jury. See, 
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044-45, 1048, 1052. The issue in Utah is 
whether Sanderson's expectations were "objectively reasonable." 
Questions of objective reasonability in wrongful discharge cases 
such as this are for the jury. See, e.g. , Stark v. Circle K Corp., 
230 Mont. 468, 751 P.2d 162, 166 (1988). 
Another way of framing the same question is whether 
Sanderson's reliance on OP 6-5.2 and on Cummings' — his direct 
supervisor — oral assurances of continued employment was 
justified. Here again the question of whether an employee's 
reliance on such promises is reasonable is a question of fact for 
the jury. See, e.g., Siekawitch v. Washington Beef Producers, 58 
Wash. App. 454, 793 P.2d 994, 998 (App. 1990). 
The indicia of a legally sufficient implied-in-fact contract, 
the objective reasonability of Sanderson's expectations, and the 
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justifiability of this reliance were all questions of fact for the 
jury. The district court erred in granting First Security's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and this Court should now reverse the 
district court and remand for a trial on the merits. 
B. The District Court Erred In Concluding That First 
Security Effectively Disclaimed The Implied-in-fact Contract 
Created By The Manual. First Security did not, and under Utah case 
law could not, disclaim its mandatory procedures. The Manual 
itself contained no disclaimer or other indication its mandatory 
procedures were discretionary or illusory. Rather, First Security 
argued, and the district court agreed, that purported disclaimers 
in two separate and unrelated documents were legally sufficient to 
disclaim the binding implied-in-fact contract that Sanderson claims 
OP 6-5.2 created. As a matter of law, First Security's purported 
disclaimer is ineffective and meaningless. 
Berube explicitly held that employee manuals such as First 
Security's create binding implied-in-fact contracts. No Utah case 
has even suggested those contracts can be "disclaimed." In fact, 
to allow such a result would totally undermine the entire rationale 
of Berube that operating procedures such as OP 6-5.2 become "part 
of the contractual relationship between the employer and the 
employee." Caldwell, 777 P.2d at p. 485. 
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An employer such as First Security cannot, by language or by 
its actions, encourage reliance on a policy, and then be free to 
only enforce it selectively. "Having announced a policy, the 
employer may not treat it as illusory*" Leikvold v. Valley View 
Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170, 174 (1980). 
In applying Leikvold, the Alaska Supreme Court wrote: 
"Employers should not be allowed to vinstill . . . reasonable 
expectations of job security' in employees, and then withdraw the 
basis for those expectations when the employee's performance is no 
longer desired." Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 
783, 788 (Alaska 1989) (quoting, Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 174). 
In Jones plaintiff nurse argued that a personnel policy manual 
issued by her employer, a hospital, and its parent modified the 
terms of the nurse's at-will employment. The hospital argued the 
manual did not rebut the employment-at-will presumption because, 
inter alia, it contained a purported disclaimer. See, id. at 787. 
The trial court entered summary judgment for the hospital and its 
parent, and the plaintiff appealed. The Alaska court ruled, as 
did this court in Berube, that employment manuals do become part 
of the contract between an employee and her employer, and that 
purported disclaimers do not prevent the formation of a contract. 
Jones is particularly relevant to this case because there, the 
employer had inserted an one-sentence disclaimer, followed by "85 
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pages of detailed text covering policies, rules, regulations and 
definitions." The court found as a matter of law that the 
purported disclaimer was not conspicuous. Here, First Security's 
145-page Manual does not even contain a disclaimer. Instead, First 
Security relies on two short inconspicuous statements contained on 
the sixth (R. 81), and fifth (R. 84) pages of totally separate 
documents, which are not even referred to in OP 6-5.2.6 
Jones also cited extensively a landmark Michigan case, 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 
N.W.2d 880 (1980) for propositions directly relevant to this case. 
Toussaint has also been previously relied on by this Court in a 
wrongful termination case. See, Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State 
College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 n. 5 (Utah 1981). 
Toussaint was a consolidated appeal by two former middle-
management employees of two different employers. Both employees, 
Toussaint and Ebling, inquired regarding job security when they 
were hired. Toussaint's employer told him he would be with the 
company as long as he did his job; Ebling was told essentially the 
same thing. The Michigan Supreme Court held at the outset that 
whether these oral representations alone constituted enforceable 
promises constituted factual questions for the jury. See, id. at 
6
 The two "disclaimers" relied on by First Security are 
included herein as Addendum "E". 
27 
p. 884. In addition, Toussaint's employer provided him with a 
personnel manual which provided that employees would be terminated 
only for just cause. In affirming the jury awards to both ex-
employees , the Toussaint court wrote: 
While an employer need not establish personnel policies 
or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such 
policies and practices and makes them known to its 
employees, the employment relationship is presumably 
enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative 
and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind 
associated with job security and the conviction that he 
will be treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations 
need take place and the parties' minds need not meet on 
the subject; nor does it matter that the employee knows 
nothing of the particulars of the employer's policies and 
practices or that the employer may change them unilater-
ally. It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably 
in its own interest, to create an environment in which 
the employee believes that, whatever the personnel 
policies and practices, they are established and official 
at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied 
consistently and uniformly to each employee. The 
employer has then created a situation "instinct with an 
obligation." 
Id. at 892 (footnotes omitted). 
The Toussaint court further identified a benefit received by 
employers which makes disclaimers particularly inappropriate in 
employment contracts: 
Having announced the policy, presumably with a view to 
obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and 
behavior and improved quality of the work force, an 
employer may not treat its promise as illusory. 
Id. at 895. 
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This Court has already indicated that one acceptable form of 
reliance — if reliance is required at all — is the use of the 
procedures by a management employee with respect to employees under 
his or her direct supervision. See, Titan Services, 783 P.2d 541 
at p. 542. Sanderson himself had followed OP 6-5.2 in terminating 
an employee under his supervision. (R. 184-85, 189, 197) , and 
observed other First Security supervisors following OP 6-5.2 in 
terminating covered employees. (R. 184-85, 189, 196). 
Even where other courts have allowed employers to disclaim the 
implied-in-fact contracts created by their manuals, those courts 
have required that, to be a legally effective disclaimer it must 
"clearly and conspicuously" tell employees "that the manual is not 
part of their employment contract and that their jobs are 
terminable at the will of the employer with or without reason." 
Leikyold, 688 P.2d at 174 (1984). No "disclaimer" relied on by 
First Security indicates in any way that the Manual or OP 6-5.2 is 
not part of the employment contract. 
Leikvold is but one example of the general rule that 
disclaimers must be both (1) clear, and (2) conspicuous. See 
generally, M. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an 
Effective Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 365, 380 (1989). 
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This same article details the requirements for a disclaimer 
to be effective in the employment relationship: 
Disclaimers, as a result of their great importance, must 
be displayed prominently in communications to employees 
in order to be effective. A conspicuous disclaimer is 
one presented so that a reasonable person against whom 
it would operate would notice it. Hence, a disclaimer 
must be separated from or contrasted with the balance of 
an employer's communication. Such a separation may be 
achieved, for example, by using different type for the 
disclaimer, such as bold, capitals or italics, by 
underlining the disclaimer, or by printing or outlining 
the disclaimer in a contrasting color. 
In Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., the employer 
included in its published standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) a disclaimer stating that the procedures did not 
constitute part of the contract of employment. The 
disclaimer was part of the general instructions of the 
SOPs. Following the employee's termination, he commenced 
a suit asserting that the SOPs created implied contract 
rights. The district court posited at the outset that 
a disclaimer must be conspicuous to be effective. 
Examining the disclaimer in Jimenez, the court observed 
that the disclaimer was not set off in such a way as to 
attract attention to it. The court noted specifically 
that "[n]othing [was] capitalized that would give notice 
of a disclaimer. The type size equal [led] that of [any] 
other provision on the same page. No border set[] the 
disclaimer apart from any other paragraph on the page." 
As a result, the court held that the disclaimer was not 
conspicuous and, therefore, not effective, and granted 
summary judgment that implied contract rights were 
created by the SOPs. 
Employers issuing multipage communications must not only 
present their disclaimers in a conspicuous manner among 
other statements on a page, but must also display their 
disclaimers on a page which is prominent within the 
communication as a whole. 
Id. at 384-85 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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Opinions published since the above article continue to require 
purported disclaimers of implied-in-fact employment contracts to 
inform employees (1) clearly, and (2) conspicuously that policy 
manuals are not part of the employee's contract of employment. 
See, e.g., Jones, 779 P.2d at p. 788; Messerly v. Asamera Minerals, 
(U.S.) Inc.. 55 Wash. App. 811, 780 P.2d 1327, 1330 (App. 1989). 
In short, First Security's alleged "disclaimers" are ineffective 
as a matter of law. 
Moreover, even if First Security's purported disclaimer 
appeared to create an effective disclaimer — which it does not — 
contrary employer statements, including publishing disciplinary 
procedures such as OP 6-5.2 that an employer must follow before 
discharge, can negate the effect of an otherwise valid disclaimer. 
See, Chagares, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. at 392. 
As noted by the New Mexico Supreme Court, under such 
circumstances, a jury question still remains as to whether a 
disclaimer indeed prevents the formation of a contract between an 
employer and employee. The district court accordingly should 
receive evidence regarding conduct within the organization that 
would indicate the disclaimer has been waived or abandoned by the 
employer. See, McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1, 791 P.2d 
452, 459 (1990). For example, an employer's policy of having its 
supervisors follow applicable termination policies and procedures 
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can negate an employer's claim that a disclaimer automatically 
vitiates an implied-in-fact contract of employment. See, id. 
Here Sanderson claims he was given the Manual, told to follow 
it, and did follow it, as did other supervisors. On such evidence, 
a jury may permissibly find the purported disclaimers to be 
ineffective in the event this Court declines to find them 
ineffective as a matter of law. 
C. The District Court Erred In Concluding That Sanderson 
Could Not Recover For Emotional Distress As Foreseeable Consequen-
tial Damages Arising From First Security's Contractual Breach. 
Consequential damages are a proper contract remedy if the losses 
resulting from the breach were reasonably within the contemplation 
of the parties when they entered into their contract. See, Berube, 
771 P.2d at p. 1050. 
This Court along with virtually all, if not all, courts in 
the Anglo-American tradition cites the case of Hadlev v. Baxendale, 
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854) as the origin of this rule. 
See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 
1985). Similarly citing Hadley v. Baxendale, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California recently 
addressed this issue in Mosely v« Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 115 
Lab. Cas. para. 56,221 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
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In Mosely, the ex-employee sued his former employer for 
wrongful termination, alleging it was foreseeable to the employer 
that the employee would have difficulty finding suitable employment 
and that this difficulty would cause him emotional distress. The 
employee contended that, due to his long tenure with the company 
and numerous promotions, the foreseeability of emotional distress 
caused by the termination of the employment contract must have been 
reasonably contemplated by both parties. 
The employer predictably argued that such recovery was an 
improper contractual remedy; and the court directed both parties 
to brief the issue of whether contract damages for emotional 
distress are available in claims for breach of contract. After the 
employee was unable to cite to any cases directly on point, the 
court wrote as follows: 
The issue thus reduces to whether the plaintiff's 
emotional distress caused by termination was foreseeable 
by both parties. This is an issue of fact which must be 
resolved at trial after both parties present their 
respective evidence. Therefore, the claim for emotional 
distress damages is allowed to proceed as a substantive 
matter. 
• * • 
Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for emotional distress 
damages arising from defendant's alleged wrongful 
termination of plaintiff is allowed to proceed and be 
submitted for determination by the trier of fact. 
Id. at pp. 79,022-23. 
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In connection with Sanderson's illness, and at the same time 
he was receiving assurances from Cummings that his own job would 
be there for him upon his recovery, and while OP 6-5 • 2 was in 
effect, Judd had a discussion with Garff, the social worker 
affiliated with Sanderson's psychiatrist. Garff told Judd that 
Sanderson's emotional stability was fragile, and that Sanderson 
would need approximately two weeks' absence from work so he could 
get himself under control. Judd himself recognized that whatever 
First Security did might cause an adverse reaction in Sanderson. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge and information, First Security 
terminated Sanderson three days latar. See Addendum "D". 
The foreseeability of damages will always hinge upon the 
nature and language of the contract and the reasonable expectations 
of the parties. See, Berube, 771 P.2d at 1050. The reasonability 
of a person's expectations involves an objective determination. 
See, e.g., Matter of Gentry, 142 Mich. App. 701, 369 N.W.2d 889, 
896 (App. 1985). Questions of objective reasonability in wrongful 
discharge cases such as this are for the jury. See, e.g. Stark, 
751 P.2d at p. 166. 
Accordingly, Sanderson is entitled to have the jury determine 
if the particular emotional distress and mental anguish he claims 
to have suffered were foreseeable to First Security and, if so, the 
extent of his damages. 
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I), The District Court Erred In Implicitly Concluding That 
The Implied Covenant Of Cood Faith And Fair Dealing Does Not Exist 
In An Employment Contract. Although it is true that Utah has not 
yet recognized a cause of action for violation of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts, see. Loose v. 
Nature-All Corp,, 785 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Utah 1989), Utah appellate 
courts have never rejected that cause of action. In Berube, two 
justices of this Court were prepared to recognize it. See, Berube, 
771 P.2d at 1046-50. In his concurrence, Justice Zimmerman 
postponed deciding the issue until a "better opportunity to 
consider the minimum rights and obligations that inhere in the 
employment relationship." Ld. at 1052. The position of Justices 
Hall and Howe is still unstated. 
In a more recent case, Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989), the plaintiff employee sued her former 
employer for, among other things, breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing that attached to her employment 
contract. She alleged generally that the employer fired her in 
order to avoid paying additional health insurance expenses. See 
id. at 669. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, 
and she appealed. In reversing the trial court's dismissal, this 
Court remanded all claims, including her claim that her employer 
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breached the covenants of good faith and fair dealing. See, id. 
at 670. 
Shortly after Judd was given the responsibility of managing 
the Equipment Services Department during Sanderson's illness, Judd 
began criticizing Sanderson's performance in written memos, none 
of which was directed to Cummings, Sanderson's supervisor. These 
actions by Judd were consistent with Sanderson's belief that Judd 
was "out to get" Sanderson. Judd's attacks on Sanderson increased 
until Sanderson's termination. As pointed out in section C, supra, 
Judd talked to one of the persons treating Sanderson three days 
before Sanderson's dismissal. During that conversation, Judd 
learned that Sanderson's emotional stability was fragile and that 
Sanderson needed approximately two weeks absence from work to get 
himself under control. Judd himself explicitly acknowledged that 
any precipitous action by First Security might cause an adverse 
reaction in Sanderson. 
Based upon these undisputed facts, a triable issue of fact 
exists as to whether First Security, through its agent, Judd, dealt 
fairly and in good faith with Sanderson. A factual situation such 
as this provides the "opportunity to consider the minimum rights 
and obligations" First Security owed Sanderson, and whether First 
Security breached those duties. This issue should, along with the 
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other issues presented by this case, be remanded for trial before 
a jury. 
E. The District Court Erred In Permitting First Security To 
File Sanderson's Deposi ti on So 1 s To Become Par t Of The Record On 
This Appeal. Rule 4-502(4), Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
reads: 
Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the court 
except as provided in Rule 4-501 of this Code or upon 
order of the court for good cause shown. 
(Emphasis added). 
Rule 4-501(1)(a) provides, however, that a party may attach 
deposition pages to legal memoranda as exhibits, a procedure 
followed by Sanderson in this case, but not by First Security. 
Accordingly, the only deposition pages considered by the district 
court were those attached to Sanderson's memorandum (R. 161-198). 
The justification First Security gave for its request to file 
Sanderson's deposition, "to enable consideration thereof by an 
appellate court" (R. 260), is directly contrary to controlling law 
on this subject: Evidence not available to the trial judge cannot 
be added to the record on appeal. See, Territorial Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n. v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Baird, the parties made repeated references to a deposition 
in their appellate briefs addressing the district court's grant of 
37 
summary judgment to defendant. The appellant moved the Utah Court 
of Appeals to supplement the record on appeal, claiming it had 
inadvertently failed to include the deposition in the record filed 
on appeal. The respondent replied that not only had the appellant 
failed to file the deposition on appeal, but that appellant also 
failed to file it with the trial court in connection with the 
summary judgment motion, the same situation presented here. In 
denying the appellant's motion to supplement, the Utah Court of 
Appeals wrote: 
Thus, the trial court did not have John Baird's 
deposition before it when it granted the trustee summary 
judgment. Evidence not available to the trial judge 
cannot be added to the record on appeal, and thus we deny 
[appellant's] motion to supplement. Accordingly, we 
consider only facts properly before the trial court, 
notwithstanding that both parties to this action 
repeatedly cite to Baird's deposition in their appellate 
briefs. 
Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the district court included in the record a 
376-page document (R. 311) which it had never seen. This district 
court's order permitting the filing of Sanderson's deposition is 
legally improper, and should also be reversed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The district court's Summary Judgment and Order should be 
reversed. The undisputed evidence before this Court demonstrates 
that Sanderson was unjustifiably denied the benefits of OP 6-5.2 
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when First Security terminated him for alleged "unsatisfactory 
performance". As in Titan Services, this Court should direct the 
district court to enter judgment against First Security as to 
liability, and to conduct a trial solely on the issue of 
Sanderson's damages. 
At the least, however, in its order of reversal, this Court 
should direct the district court to conduct a trial on all of 
Sanderson's claims, including his contractually based claim for 
emotional distress and his claim that First Security breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its termination 
of Sanderson. 
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I hereby certify that I caused four true copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief to be served by mailing the same, 
postage prepaid, via the U.S. mail, on the /&> day of November, 
1990, and addressed as follows: 
Janet Hugie Smith 
Rick L. Rose 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 




IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RUSSELL W, SANDERSON, \ 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ; 
vs» 
FIRST SECURITY LEASING COMPANY, \ 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
1 Case H- 900254 
i Priority 16 
ADDENDA 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR-6 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Cje>t^zi>^ A^w 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL W. SANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY LEASING COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 890905900CN 
The Court having considered the Motion for an Order to 
File the Plaintiff's Deposition filed on behalf of the defendant 
and the Memorandum in Opposition and in Support thereof and being 
fully advised in the premises now makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Order heretofore signed will be allowed to stand. 
The Court is of the opinion that the evidence upon which, inter 
alia, the Summary Judgment was granted was as attached to the 
pleadings of the plaintiff. In order for those matters to be 
considered by the Court on Appeal the deposition in it's whole 
must be filed but the Court will consider, I am sure, only that 
SANDERSON V FIRST SECURITY PAGE 2 MEMO DECISION 
portion which was cited by the parties. Thus the undersigned can 
see no mischief in putting the whole of the deposition in even 
though only limited portions were used for the purpose of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, no order need be filed hereon. 
DATED this It day of April, 1990. 
JANET HUGIE SMITH (A522 9) 
RICK L. ROSE (A5140) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Bv 
F51I3SHST&SST«0U&T 
Third JudicW District 
APR 1 1 1990 
/ *K.fittt rw 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
RUSSELL W. SANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY LEASING COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890905900CN 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
ooOoo 
Defendant First Security Leasing Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the Court on March 23, 
1990, with Janet Hugie Smith appearing on behalf of defendant and 
Thomas R. Karrenberg and Bruce Wycoff appearing on behalf of 
plaintiff, Russell W. Sanderson. The Court having reviewed the 
pleadings, motion papers, legal memoranda and deposition cited 
therein submitted by counsel, and having heard the oral arguments, 
and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint and all claims 
for relief and causes of action contained therein are dismissed 
with prejudice on the basis that plaintiff Sanderson's employment 
relationship with First Security Leasing Company was at-will and 
could be terminated by either party at any time, with or without 
cause. Further, Sanderson is not entitled to recover damages for 
mental and emotional distress under his employment contract claim. 
Summary judgment shall be entered in accordance with this 
order. * 
Approved as to form: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Bruce Wycoff 
ANDERSON Sc WATKINS 




RRST SECURITY BANKS 
O P E R A T I N G P R O C E D U R E S 
SUBJECT: 
OP 6 - Employee Relations 
5 - Employee Relations and Terminations 
.2 - Managing for Improvement Procedure 
POLICY 
1. F i r s t Security follows the Managing for Improvement Procedure as a 
guideline for d i sc ip l inary action taken by management for all Fir^z Security 
Employees (o f f ice r /non-of f ice r ) . 
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY THE MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE 
Z. 7ne Managing for Improvement Procedure i s used to deal with :*o d i s t i nc t 
types of d isc ip l inary proolems. 
(a) Job P^rfomancs: Repeated fa i lure to meet performance standards. 
(b) Policy Violation: 
(1) Repeated violat ion of F i r s t Security work rules /pol icy. 
(2) A s ing le , serious viola t ion of work ru les /po l icy . 
GCCWEHTIWG THE MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE 
3. Documentation 1s desc r ibed in d e t a i l in Volume V of the Personnel 
Ccnwunication Se r i e s , Employment P rac t i ces . 
(a) Documentation a t the informal stage i s not retained in the Employee 
Personnel F i l e . 
(b) (Documentation at the formal stage i s retained in the Employee 
Personnel F i l e . 
MANAGING FOtt IMPRQVEMEHT PROCEDURE 
4. (a) Informal Stage * The informal stage i s used to address i n i t i a l jcb 
performance/policy violat ion problems. 
(1) Oiscuss the s i t u a t i o n with the employee. Listen to the 
employee and work together to determine causes for apparent 
problems. 
(2) If a job performance problem exists , determine if the emoloyee 
has had sufficient training. 
EXHIWT 
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MA WAGING FOR IMPffOVSMSMT PROCEDURE (CQMT) 
(2) I f a policy violation has occurred, determine i f the employee 
understands work rules/policy. 
(4) Oiscuss appropriate behavior with the employee. Make sure 
that the employee understands what is expected and tna 
conseouences for repeated violation. 
(b) Foraal Stage - The formal stage is used to rectify job 
perrormance/policy violation problems which have not been resolved 
at the informal stace. Use of the formal stage is also appropriate 
i f the employee fai ls into a pattern of repeated violation after 
showing a short term chance in behavior as a result of involvement 
in tne informal stage. 
( i ) Job Performance Problems: 
(A) When informal action is ineffective, prepare a plan for 
improvement with the employee. Describe the behavioral 
change reouired, rime frsm^ allotted for improvement, and 
consecuences requiring frcm failure to improve, which may 
include prooaticn, suspension, or salary review. 
(B) I f the employee does not imorove performance within the 
allotted time frame, place the employee on probation for 
a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days. 
(C) I f the employee does not improve performance during the 
probationary period, terminate the employee in accordance 
with bank/subsidiary policy. 
(2) Policy Violation Problems: 
(A) Prepart a written warning for the employee when informal 
discussion of a policy violation has been ineffective. 
Includt i record of events, behavior that violated the 
work rule/policy, and the consecuences resulting from 
repeated violation. 
(8) I f violations continue after a written warning, suspend 
the cnployee for a period of one to three days without 
pay. 
(C) I f violations occur after the suspension, terminate the 
employee. 
5. Suspensions/terminations resulting from tins procedure are to be 
approved by the Qfvfsfon/Sudsfdfary Head Off fee. 
5. In sftuatfens where employee behavfor warrants fmrne^  fa re ten&fnatfon me 
stages of tin's process do not need to be followed. Termination in these 
cases must be approved by the appropriate 01visi on/Subsidiary Head Offfee. 
CCMPSHSATIOH GarDgLIMES 
7. Employees fnvolved fn the fomal stage of the procedure are not 
for job announcements (where applicable),'and salary increases. eHgfbie 
00141 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: Personnel File 
FROM: Gary Judd 
DATE: May 15, 1989 
SUBJECT: Russ Sanderson 
On Friday, May 12, 1989, I was finally able to contact Rob Garff, 
social worker for Mr. Sanderson and evidently a psychologist, to 
discuss his health. He reported Russ was suffering from stress 
and emotional upset as a result of a divorce and his job and the 
change in supervisor, as well as other changes in Equipment 
Services. Therefore, he did in fact, recommend Mr. Sanderson 
seek a leave of absence for at least two weeks. He would not 
elaborate and would not explain any details as to the treatment 
Mr. Sanderson is receiving, and his conclusions. He evidently is 




Telephone Conversation - May 12, 1989 - Rob Garff/Gary Judd 
J: Mr. Garff 
G: Yes 
J: This is Gary Judd of First Security Leasing 
G: Yes 
J: I'm Russ Sandersons1 supervisor 
G: Right 
J: I just called that we might better understand what his 
situation is. 
G: OK 
J: He has been gone a great deal and says he won't be back for 
perhaps another month, so I though I'd better give you a 
call and try to 
G: Uh, I kind of feel like he needs a leave of absence for 
awhile just to give himself a chance to get on his feet a 
little better and to decide where he is going with all of 
this. 
J: Uh, I'm not sure what, is it the divorce, or his work, or 
G: The divorce, the work, the changes there, how it's affecting 
him, because he is apparently feeling some real pressure 
from up there. 
J: Uh-huh, so is that creating the problem, the stress, that 
he's 
G: well, I think that is a good part of it right at this 
present time 
J: Uh-huh, what is your feeling about it? How sensitive is his 
situation? 
G: Ok, in relation, uh how do you mean, what are you asking? 
J: Well, I'm just asking of his well-being, frankly, how he is, 
we are a little concerned, about him. We are concerned that. 
whatever we do might cause an adverse reaction, so we are a 
little concerned about him 
G: Well, and I think he is as well, and I am, as far as that's 
concerned too. I know that there, from what he's been 
telling me, that there are some changes taking place up 
there and, changes in supervision, changes that way, and I 
1000:9
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think piling those all right now, along with the other 
things that he's been going through, ya, are causing some 
adverse reaction to him and I think he, you know, he needs a 
little time to get, to get himself under control. 
OK, well, I guess I'm not exactly certain what we, what to 
do. We can just 
Does he have the time that he can have the leave of absence? 
Well, frankly, he pretty much used up all the time, but, 
he's been off a great deal during the past six months, or 
even longer since his divorce. I guess it was mid-summer, so 
that's one concern, that's not the main concern. We just 
have a business to run and he's the manager of a certain 
department, and he just hasn't been here. 
Uh-huh 
So we've got to make some changes, we can't operate this 
way. That's been explained to him and I don't think the 
change in supervisor has anything to do with it because his 
performance prior to that was not adequate and not 
responsive, so I think that's created some of his problem 
That came about as far as from, you know, from the divorce 
Could have, yes 
That is becoming more resolved. 
Ok, so 
I probably will not see him until next week now, and perhaps 
I can talk with him a little bit about it and see where 
we're going again next week, and then maybe we can get back 
together. 
But it is your recommendation that he stays away from work, 
is that correct? 
That's my recommendation that he have a leave of absence. 
How long, Mr. Garff? 
Right now I'm not sure that I could give you an adequate, I 
would think at least a couple of weeks. 
Ok, I appreciate that. 
Ok, 
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career development, feel Uvc to discuss it with your super-
visor or appropriate manager. If you are qualified tor an 
opening, you may be considered for advancement. 
Employment Duration 
E mployment with First Security is "at will" employment and is, therefore, not for any rixvx\ period of time. Your 
employment with First Security is at the will and discretion 
of First Security and may be terminated at any time by First 
Security or by you :LS an employee. 
ON THE JOB 
Working Status 
Employees are classified as full-time, part-time, or tem-porary. Full and part-time employment means that you 
are scheduled to work a certain number of hours each work 
week, subject to the company 's discretion. Temporary 
employment is for a specified period or in a job on an inter-
mittent basis The extent of participation in the First Security 
benefits program is based on your employment status. 
In addition, the federal Fair l-abor Standard Act classifies 
employees into two general categories based on requirements 
for min imum wages and overtime compensation: 
a. "Exempt" includes executives, professional, 
administrative employees and certain sales represen-
tatives as defined by the U.S. Department of l-ibor. 
b. "Nonexempt" includes all other employees. 
If you are considered a nonexempt employee, you are 
covered under the provisions of the Act and are eligible for 
overtime pay w h e n applicable. 
Working Hours 
T he number of hours worked, start, and completion times differ throughout the organization. Your supervisor will 
explain the working hours in your office. First Security's 
standard work week is from 12.01 a.m. Sunday to midnight 
Saturday 
Report of Hours Worked 
N onexempt employees are responsible for recording on a time sheet tl houis woiked each day Flea.se reeoul 
Q \uu i time \\\ ,iml out to the nearest live minutes Time 
o 
to your supervisor at the cnc\ of each pay period. 
Lunch/Break Periods 
S ince First Security is open continuously during the work-ing day, lunch and break periods are scheduled on a stag-
gered basis in most offices. The length of the scheduled 
lunch period varies throughout the organization to suit the 
needs of the office Lunch periods, however, may not be less 
than 30 minutes. Morning and afternoon break periods of 15 
minutes each are provided. The lunch period is not time 
worked, but the break periods are included as work time. 
Your supervisor will explain the scheduling of lunch and 
break periods for your department or office. 
Dress Policy 
F irst Security's dress and grooming policy is a business standard that avoids extremes in fashions and hairstyles. 
We have responded to changes in fashion, modifying the 
accepteel standards of appropriate I ^ss dress to include 
more variety inrcQ.lors, styles, .textures and lines, and we will 
continue to do so. The financial services industry has 
historically expected employees to dress conservatively and 
moderately, and this philosophy stili applies. Your supervisor 
or the Human Resources Division will be happy to answer 
any questions you might have regarding appropriate dress 
and grooming standards. Inappropriate dress will result in 
counseling by your supervising officer or manager. 
Personal Data 
Be sure that your personnel records are correct and up to date. Please notify your local personnel officer of any 
changes in your marital status, number of dependents, home 
address or telephone number. If you have furthered your 
education or received any special honors or recognitions, 
we'd like to know. 
Changes in dependent medical insurance coverage must 
be reported within 30 days to the Benefits Department. 
Personal Telephone Calls/Mail 
1^ irst Security's teleph •• system plays an important part . in the conduct of daily business. While you may make < 
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GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY 
First Security's reputation for honesty, integrity, and safety is the 
sum o\ the personal reputations of its employees. First Security 
depends upon the talents and efforts of its employees for its 
excellent performance. 
First Security Standards for Employee Conduct is intended to govern 
your actions and working relationships with customers, fellow 
employees, competitors, government representatives, 
communications media, or any one else by whom you may be 
identified as an employee of First Security. Furthermore, what you 
are prohibited from doing under these standards shall not be done, 
or knowingly permitted to be done indirectly, through relatives, 
friends, or otherwise. 
There may be occasions when First Security must change rules 
or give current rules a different interpretation than previously 
made. First Security has the right to modify policies, both written 
and unwritten. The language used in these standards is not 
intended to create, nor is it to be construed as, a contract between 
First Security and any or all of its employees. 
Employment with First Security is "at will" employment and is, 
therefore, not for any fixed period of time. Your employment with 
First Security is at the will and discretion of First Security and may 
be ended at any time by First Security or by you as an employe 
The terms "First Security" and "Company", as used in these 
standards, mean First Security Corporation and each of its 
subsidiary companies. The term "employees" includes all full and 
part-time employees of First Security Corporation and each of 
subsidiary companies. The term "senior management" denotes tl 
position of senior vice president or higher. 
In many situations involving ethical or moral judgments, it ma; 
be difficult to determine the correct course of action. In such 
instances, you are not required to rely solely on your own judgiru 
but are encouraged to discuss the matter in full with your 
supervisor. Full disclosure of the facts in timely fashion to pre 
authority, with resulting approval, will always serve to meet you 
responsibilities with respect to these standards. 
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